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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
COMMERCF--LICENsES AND PRIVILEGE TAXEs-WHETHER OR NOT A
MUNICIPAL LICENSE TAX IS VIOLATIVE OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE WHEN
LICENSEE's INTERSTATE AND LOCAL BUSINESSES ARE INSEPARABLE-There
is some reason to believe that the Supreme Court of the United States
has recently decided to allow local taxation to invade previously prohibited
territory, by an extension of the "home port" theory, judging by the
353
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outcome of the case of City of Chicago v. Willett Company.1 In that case,
a cartage company engaged in business within a city without first having
obtained, and having paid for, a license required by a municipal ordi-
nance.2 The eity failed to secure a conviction for a violation of the ordi-
nance and, on direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court because the
validity of a municipal ordinance was involved,3 the judgment of acquittal
was there affirmed when the court concluded that the defendant was not
subject to the license tax since it could not separate its loads into inter-
state and intrastate business, nor could it discontinue any part of its
service. 4 The Supreme Court of the United States thereafter granted
certiorari but, being uncertain as to whether the state court decision had
been reached on the basis of a constitutional question, it remanded the case
for clarification. 5 After the state supreme court had clearly held that the
ordinance ran afoul of the commerce clause of the federal constitution,6
the Supreme Court of the United States again took the case and this time
it reversed the holding, declaring that the tax involved no violation of
the federal commerce clause even though the defendant's interstate and
local business operations were inseparable and the tax purported to apply
only to the latter.7
Settlement of the problem of determining whether or not local taxation
places an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce has always been
a troublesome matter at best, as is well illustrated by the split of the judges
in the instant case, but, since Brown v. Maryland,8 the principle that an
occupational tax cannot be exacted for the privilege of engaging in inter-
state commerce has been firmly adhered to in American law.9 It was there
that Chief Justice Marshall announced the firm rule to be that, in the
1 - U. S. -, 73 S. Ct. 460, 97 L. Ed. (adv.) 333 (1953). Justice Douglas wrote
a dissenting opinion.
2 Municipal Code, Chicago, 1931, Ch. 163.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199, provides for direct appeal in such
cases.
4 See 406 Ill. 286 at 295, 94 N. E. (2d) 195 at 200 (1950).
5341 U. S. 913, 71 S. Ct. 734, 95 L. Ed. 1349 (1951).
6 The clarifying opinion, which appears in 409 Ill. 480, 101 N. E. (2d) 205(1951), was based on the proposition that a carter who engaged in both inter-
state and intrastate business could not validly be made subject to the ordinance
when every load contained intrastate and interstate property, which could not
be separated, and the carter could not continue either of its operations without
the other.
7 Mr. Justice Reed, with whom the Chief Justice joined, wrote a separate con-
curring opinion, basing it on the fact that the carter did intrastate business on
the streets of Chicago and vicinity. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas
regarded the tax as unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce.
8 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 6 L. Ed. 678 (1827).
9 The opinion in the instant case, - U. S. - at -, 73 S. Ct. 460 at 464, 97
L. Ed. (adv.) 333 at 338, lists the cases.
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interest of federal power over interstate commerce, neither a state nor
an instrumentality thereof could tax interstate commerce in any form or
manner which would impose a direct burden on such commerce. 10
Since taxation of any sort would, in some way, constitute an imposition
upon interstate commerce, it became necessary to modify this rule to an
extent sufficient to permit local taxation affecting interstate commerce in
an incidental, rather than a direct, fashion; otherwise interstate commerce
would enjoy an immunity from taxation while enjoying the benefit of
state and local services. Various forms of indirect levy have, therefore,
been upheld and the privilege has been extended to include the taxation
of the occupation of interstate motor transportation so long as the tax
proves to be reasonable and is fixed according to some uniform, fair, and
practical standard." This extension, made necessary in order to allow the
states to receive reasonable compensation for the expense entailed in pro-
viding and maintaining roads, has been classified as coming under the
police power of the states, a power which the state may delegate to a
municipality, entitling it to exact a tax or fee from the interstate motor
carrier for the same purpose.12 The tax involved in the instant case, how-
ever, could not be justified as coming under the police power since it did
not meet the aforementioned requirements. It was called an occupational
tax by the Illinois Supreme Court,'8 and this classification was accepted
by the federal court.
While states may, in the exercise of the police power, regulate or affect
the business of interstate transportation in a variety of ways without
violating the commerce clause, they have not been permitted to withhold
the right to engage in interstate commerce, nor have they been permitted
to make the existence of that right depend upon the fulfillment of state-
imposed requirements. Thus, in Spector v. O'Connor,14 a statute of- Con-
10 In the course of dealing with an argument made in Brown v. Maryland, 25
U. S. (12 Wheat.) 419 at 448, 6 L. Ed. 678 at 689, to the effect that a construc-
tion of the commerce power so as to prevent a state government from levying
duties on imports would abridge the acknowledged power of a state to tax its
citizens, Chief Justice Marshall said: "We admit this power to be sacred; but
cannot admit that it may be used so as to obstruct the free course of a power
given to Congress. We cannot admit that it may be used so as to obstruct or
defeat the power to regulate commerce."
11 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 S. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385 (1915).
12 Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 48 S. Ct. 502, 72 L. Ed. 833, 62 A. L. R.
45 (1928). The police power was utilized, in the more recent case of Bode v.
Barrett, - U. S. -, 73 S. Ct. 468, 97 L. Ed. (adv.) 343 (1953), to sustain a flat
license fee, measured by the gross weight of a truck used both in interstate and
intrastate commerce, assessed by Illinois for the privilege of using the state
highways.
13 See 406 Ill. 286 at 295, 94 N. E. (2d) 195 at 200.
14340 U. S. 602, 71 S. Ct. 508, 95 L. Ed. 573 (1951).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
necticut sought to impose a tax on the privilege of doing business within
the state, which tax also fell upon motor carriers. The tax was held invalid,
insofar as it related to exclusively interstate trucking operations, even
though the tax was purported to be calculated only on the profits realized
from local business. On the other hand, a state or one of its instrumentali-
ties may, by appropriate legislation, require payment of an occupation
tax on the part of one engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce
so long as (1) the tax is imposed solely on account of the intrastate busi-
ness; (2) the amount exacted is not increased because of the interstate
business done; (3) a person engaged exclusively in interstate commerce
is not made subject to the imposition; and (4) a person taxed may dis-
continue intrastate business without being forced to withdraw from his
interstate operations.15 The instant case fell short of this established pat-
tern in the last respect.
Principles developed over a period of years in an attempt to harmonize
the prohibition against burdening interstate commerce with the right of
a state to place licensing taxes on occupations conducted within its borders
help to sharpen the contrast provided by the case at hand. Take, for ex-
ample, one of the earliest and clearest cases on this problem, that of
Leloup v. City of Mobile. 6 A New York telegraph company doing busi-
ness in Alabama there failed to pay a license tax as required under the
terms of a city ordinance relating to telegraph companies which did busi-
ness in the city. Holding the tax invalid, the United States Supreme Court
treated it as a general license tax affecting the entire business, interstate
as well as local. Two years later, this principle was again invoked, in
Crutcheer v. Kentucky, 7 at the instance of a foreign express company
which did both local and interstate business and the court found the tax
objectionable since it might also fall on one engaged only in interstate
activity.
These cases found a logical sequitur in the decision achieved in the case
of Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kansasi s where it was held that
a state could not exclude a foreign corporation from doing merely local
business if such exclusion would unreasonably burden its non-excludable
interstate business. Kansas there endeavored to collect a charter fee of
a given percentage of the entire capital stock from all corporations doing
local business, regardless of where the property was located. While the
court felt that the tax might have been sustained if it had been imposed
15 Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 48 S. Ct. 502, 72 L. Ed. 833, 62 A. L.
R. 45 (1928).
16 127 U. S. 640, 8 S. Ct. 1380, 32 L. Ed. 311 (1888).
17 141 U. S. 47, 11 S. Ct. 851, 35 L. Ed. 649 (1890).
18 216 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355 (1909).
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on local property only, despite its use in connection with interstate com-
merce, and clearly indicated that the tax would have been upheld if it
had been apportioned to that part of the capital utilized in intrastate
activities, the primary basis for the decision rested on the fact that &
burden could not be imposed on interstate activity through the guise of
placing a burden on domestic commerce, when domestic and interstate
transactions were inseparable.
Paralleling this line of development is another line of cases wherein
local impositions have been upheld apparently because the tax fell exclu-
sively on the intrastate portion of the business conducted. In Osborne v.
Florida,19 for example, a Florida statute required the payment of a license
fee before doing intrastate business. The agent of an express company
engaged in both interstate and local business failed to pay as he felt the
tax did not apply in his case. The state sued and won on the theory that
the license was exacted only from intrastate business, was one which could
have been avoided if the company had refrained from doing intrastate
business, and because the levy was in no way increased by reason of the
interstate activity. The same principle was relied upon in another case
where the tax was measured by the gross receipts arising from domestic
business and not influenced by receipts from interstate business. 20 Even
so, the principle is not one which can be easily applied, judging by the case
of Cooney v. Mountain State Telephone & Telegraph Company.21 The State
of Montana there attempted to impose an annual license tax upon each
telephone instrument used within the state which the taxpayer sought to
restrain as an undue burden on interstate commerce. The court agreed,
believing the tax to be improperly proportioned since, a larger number
of instruments being in use because of the interstate business, the tax
was increased because of the interstate activity.
Returning to the instant case, it is apparent that the case was not
one which clearly met the requirements previously established in order
to avoid a violation of the protection afforded by the commerce clause
for the intrastate and interstate business could not be separated; the
carter could not discontinue either operation without giving up the entire
business; the amount of the tax was increased because of the interstate
business; and there was no attempt to proportion the tax according to
the amount of intrastate business done. The fact that the defendant
engaged in interstate business obviously forced an increase in the number
19 164 U. S. 650, 17 S. Ct. 214, 41 L. Ed. 586 (1896).
20 Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339, 12 S. Ct. 250, 35 L. Ed. 1035
(1892).
21294 U. S. 384, 55 S. Ct. 477, 79 L. Ed. 934 (1935).
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of trucks used, increased the tax and placed a direct burden upon inter-
state commerce via an occupational tax.
All of these considerations were disregarded when the court applied
the "home port" theory to bring all of the trucks under state jurisdiction
for purpose of taxation so as to make the flat license fee apply to all of
them. Two outstanding cases expounding the "home port" theory were
relied upon. In the first of them, that of New York Central & Hudson
River Railroad Company v. Miller,22 the State of New York imposed a
franchise tax on all New York corporations computed on the amount of
capital stock employed in New York. It levied this tax against the rail-
road on the basis of the number of cars used by the company within the
state. The taxpayer contended the assessment was unfair as the cars
were constantly in and out of the state and that a proper assessment
could be made only by using some proportional factor such as the average
number of cars in the state throughout the taxing period or the relation
between the track mileage within the state when compared to the mileage
elsewhere. The court, however, held that the state of origin remained
the state of permanent situs of the property, notwithstanding the occa-
sional excursion of the cars to foreign parts. It was also indicated that,
as the cars had not obtained a taxation situs elsewhere, they could properly
be taxed by New York.
The "home port" theory was extended even further in the second
case, that of Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State of Minnesota,23 wherein
the state was allowed to tax all of the airplanes used by the carrier, a
Minnesota corporation, although the actual proportion of the mileage
flown in Minnesota was only fourteen per cent. of the total. It was said
that, with the presence of the "home port" in Minnesota, a relation
existed between the carrier and the state which existed with no other
state and the benefits ensuing from that relationship afforded the con-
stitutional foundation for the property tax. While the case was not one
concerning an occupational tax, it should be noted that a requirement
calling for a determination of the exact proportion of property used
within the state had previously been enforced. 24
Selection of the "home port" theory, as expounded in these two cases,
produced the result attained in the Willett case for the carter was a
local corporation and all of its trucks were based in Illinois, but, to
accomplish that result in a case involving an occupational tax, it was
22 202 U. S. 584, 26 S. Ct. 714, 50 L. Ed. 1155 (1905).
23 322 U. S. 292, 64 S. Ct. 950, 88 L. Ed. 1283, 153 A. L. R. 245 (1944).
24 Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. State of Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158, 54 S. Ct. 152,
79 L. Ed. 238 (1933).
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necessary to avoid the holding in Barrett v. New York. 25 The city had
there attempted to enforce a municipal ordinance requiring a local license
as a condition precedent to conducting an express business within the
city. The carrier, engaged in both intrastate and interstate transportation,
was able to show that its strictly intrastate activity amounted to only
two per cent. of its total business and, as a consequence, the court held
the tax was invalid and unduly burdensome on interstate commerce. As no
reference was made there to the Miller case, which had previously ex-
pounded the "home port" theory, the job of avoidance was not made very
difficult.
The Willett case, then, now establishes the law to be that a local
corporation, engaged in interstate and intrastate activities, with all of
its property based within the state, can be subjected to an occupational
tax without producing a violation of the commerce clause, unless it can
discharge the burden of showing the proportion of its interstate activity
and can demonstrate the fact that the tax constitutes an undue imposition
thereon. Its mere inability to make the division will not be enough to
avoid the levy. As the motor transport industry continues to grow, the
problem of the degree to which interstate motor carriers may expect to
receive protection under the commerce clause will grow more and more
important. Until recently, the United States Supreme Court had greatly
limited the right of a state government to tax such carriers, possibly
because the economic interests of the country demanded that protection
be afforded to fledgling corporations. The court seems to look at the
problem differently today.
R. M. SCHELLY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-WHETHER OR NOT
CONGRESS MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY TAx ILLEGAL INTRASTATE GAMBLING
AND COMPEL SELF-INCRIMINATING DISCLOSURES WITH REGARD THERETO-
The Supreme Court of the United States, through the medium of the
recent case of United States v. Kahriger,l had occasion to pass upon the
constitutionality of the highly controversial Gambler's Occupational Tax
Act.2 An information, filed against Kahriger, alleged that he was in the
business of accepting wagers, had willfully failed to register 3 with the
Collector of Internal Revenue, and had failed to pay the occupational
25 232 U. S. 14, 34 S. Ct. 203, 58 L. Ed. 483 (1913).
1-U. S.-, 73 S. Ct. 510, 97 L. Ed. (adv.) 504 (1953), reversing 105 F. Supp. 322(1952). Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinion as did Mr. Justice
Black, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas concurred.
226 U. S. C. § 3285, et seq.
3 Ibid. § 3291.
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tax in question. 4 He moved to dismiss the information on the ground
the statutory sections relied on were unconstitutional for two reasons,
to-wit: (1) because Congress, under the pretense of exercising the taxing
power, had attempted to penalize a form of intrastate activity thereby
usurping a police power reserved to the states, and (2) because the regis-
tration provisions violated the privilege against self-incrimination. His
motion having been sustained by the district court, upon a declaration
that the tax measure was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court, on direct
appeal, 5 reversed that decision when a majority of the court concluded
the tax statute was constitutional.
In order to reach this decision, the court had to determine three
things, to-wit: (1) whether Congress could lawfully tax a specified busi-
ness which was not within its power to regulate; (2) whether the penalty
provisions in the tax statute were imposed for a breach of a regulation
which concerned activities in themselves subject to state regulations; and
(3) whether the information required by the registration provisions
amounted to a denial of the privilege against self-incrimination. It
answered the first question in the affirmative, indicating that an act of
Congress which, "on its face," purports to be a proper exercise of the
taxing power may not be regarded as any the less so because the tax
tends to restrict, suppress, or discourage the thing or activity taxed.
In such cases, the court said, it would refuse to inquire into unexpressed
motives which may have impelled Congress to exercise a power con-
stitutionally conferred upon it. On the second point, the court held that
the regulatory provisions of the tax statute were directly and intimately
related to the collection of a valid tax, hence were obviously supportable
as in aid of the revenue provisions. With regard to the third question,
the court decided that the privilege against self-incrimination applied only
to past acts, not to future acts which may or may not be committed,
and that the information required from the applicant did not force him
to disclose that he had, in the past, been engaged in gambling activities
but merely informed him that, to engage in future business of this type,
he would have to comply with the conditions prescribed in the tax statutes.
Congress, of course, has been given the plenary power "to levy and
collect taxes,"0 which generic phraseology includes all species of taxation:
duties, imposts, and excises, as well as other forms. The only express
limitation upon this power to tax, insofar as excise taxes are concerned,
lies in the fact that "all excises shall be uniform throughout
4 Ibid., §3290.
5 Direct appeal, because of the constitutional issue, is authorized by 18 U. S. C.§ 3731.
6 U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8.
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the United States," a limitation which has been interpreted to be measured
merely in terms of geographical uniformity.7 Except for this limitation,
it is axiomatic that Congress possesses complete discretionary power to
subject every person, every occupation, and every form of property to
such taxation as it may deem necessary and proper to impose s and, while
the primary purpose of taxation has been to obtain revenue, the power
may also be used to accomplish incidental regulatory results. In fact,
as it would be impossible to tax persons, things, and transactions without
generating social and economic consequences of a non-fiscal nature, Con-
gress has heretofore initiated taxation policies intended to discourage
production, consumption, or the transfer of harmful, deleterious, or dan-
gerous commodities 9 or to protect domestic industries against foreign
competition. 10
The absence of a general police power to regulate directly does not
deny the possibility that regulation for ulterior purposes, through the
exercise of a taxing power or some other delegated power, may not have
been furnished to the federal government, providing it with a degree
of police power incidentally derived therefrom. Thus, the United States
Supreme Court has sustained tax measures, despite their regulatory
features and even though they incidentally affected matters ordinarily
considered state concern, with respect to a tariff to encourage domestic
industries in competition with foreign producers," a tax on state bank
notes which had the effect of driving them out of circulation, 12 a license
tax on dealers in firearms of the type used mainly by gangsters,' 8 a tax
which discouraged the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine, 1 4 a tax
on the manufacture and sale of certain narcotic drugs,15 and a tax on
the transfer of marihuana. 6
A different situation exists, however, when Congress attempts to use
7 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 S. Ct. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969 (1900).
s Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 533, 19 L. Ed. 482 (1869).
9 See Grant, "Commerce, Production and the Fiscal Powers of Congress," 45
Yale L. J. 751 (1936).
10 Hampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624 (1927).
11 The principal case on that point is Hampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394,
48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624 (1927).
12 The holding in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 533, 19 L. Ed. 482
(1869), depends in part on an alternative ground relating to the federal monetary
power.
1s Sonzinsky v. United States. 300 U. S. 506, 57 S. Ct. 554, 81 L. Ed. 772 (1937).
14 McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78 (1904).
15 Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332, 48 S. Ct. 388, 72 L. Ed. 600 (1928);
United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 S. Ct. 214, 63 L. Ed. 493 (1919).
16 United States v. Sanchez, 340 U. S. 42, 71 S. Ct. 108, 95 L. Ed. 47 (1950).
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the taxing power for the purpose of regulating matters wholly outside
the scope of any delegated federal power. In that connection, an attempt
to levy a tax on the employment of children under a specified age, 17 a
tax on every bushel of grain involved in a contract of sale for future
delivery,' 8 a tax on retail dealers in malt liquors predicated solely on a
violation of state law,19 and a tax designed to regulate agricultural pro-
duction, 20 have been invalidated.
The question naturally generated by the foregoing observations con-
cerns itself with the extent to which the Supreme Court will act to
restrict Congress in the enactment of tax measures coupled with incidental
regulatory features. In an effort to provide some semblance of an answer,
the Supreme Court has evolved two directly contrary tests which appear
to have been mutually intended to strike a balance between the current
economic pattern of the country and the Constitution. The first of these
tests, developed in the case of McCray v. United States,2' might be called
the "on the face" test of constitutionality..
The McCray case grew out of the levy, imposed by Congress, of a
tax of ten cents per pound upon oleomargarine which had been artificially
colored to look like butter. The contention was made that this rate was
so high as to justify a presumption that the Congressional motive was not
that a revenue should be secured but that manufacture should be pre-
vented, thereby rendering the act unconstitutional. The statute was up-
held as being, upon its face, a revenue measure with the United States
Supreme Court saying that neither the motives of Congress nor the
ultimate effect of the law could be judicially inquired into. The court
then relied on four principles, to-wit: (1) there is a general presumption
of constitutionality which attaches to all statutes; (2) there are no con-
stitutional limits upon the mere rate of taxation; (3) Congress has un-
limited discretion in the selection of the objects of taxation; and (4) the
judiciary should not inquire into or explore the motives of Congress
which led to the exercise of the delegated power. This more or less
mechanically produced result was the one which could be expected to
17 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 47 (1922).
But see United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed.
609 (1941), wherein the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. 0. § 201 set seq., was
upheld as a valid exercise of the commerce power, leading to an extention of con-
gressional control over sub-standard labor conditions.
18 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 S. Ct. 453, 66 L. Ed. 823 (1922). But see Board
of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 470, 67 L. Ed. 839 (1923),
wherein the Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., was upheld as a
valid exercise of the interstate commerce power.
19 United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 56 S. Ct. 223, 80 L. Ed. 233 (1935).
20 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477 (1935).
21195 U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78 (1904).
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flow from the use of the label of "a revenue measure," whether the
application was correct or not.
The second test, achieved in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company,
22
might be dubbed the "purposes and effects" test. Congress once sought to
prevent the employment in industry of children of tender years by provid-
ing for a tax of ten per cent on the net profits for the year earned by those
who knowingly employed children within the prescribed age limits during
any portion of the year. The Supreme Court decided that the act was
unconstitutional because the various provisions of the statute indicated an
intention to regulate matters over which Congress could claim no author-
ity. The decision rested on several points, to-wit: (1) the tax was sug-
gestive of a punitive purpose in that the amount of the tax did not vary
with the amount of the thing being taxed; (2) the tax law drew a distinc-
tion between willful and unwitting employment of minors, a distinction
more nearly appropriate in a criminal law rather than a revenue measure;
(3) the statute provided for elaborate regulation of conduct over which
Congress had no control; and (4) such regulation of conduct was para-
mount and dominant rather than the incidental regulation typical of a
revenue measure. Under this test, the validity of a tax statute would be
determined by its purposes and effects as disclosed by a sensible construc-
tion of all of its provisions.
There is no doubt that the tax statute involved in the instant could
readily be sustained by an application of the "on the face" test of con-
stitutionality, particularly since it was wrapped in the "verbal cellophane
of a revenue measure," 23 even though the holding would permit Congress
to achieve results in an area where it had no direct power to act and where
the attainment of social reform was the primary purpose with thought of
revenue a secondary matter. This rather dim acknowledgment, however,
leaves one in quest for a doctrine sufficient to sustain a regulatory tax
which would fall within the precise limits of the taxing power. The
wisdom of the legislature cannot be questioned, but the promotion of social
reform could have been accomplished in another fashion without causing
the guise of a regulatory tax measure to overshadow the police power of
the states.24 Justification of the principle that Congress may use its
powers to aid the states in the enforcement of criminal laws may be found
in such instances as the provision for supplying information to state officers
after the same has been gathered by the division of identification and
22 259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817 (1922).
23 See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, - U. S. - at -, 73 S.
Ct. 510 at 518, 97 L. Ed. (adv.) 504 at 513.
24 See Baker, "Taxation: Potential Destroyer of Crime," 29 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
Rmw 197 (1951).
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information of the federal Bureau of Investigation, 25 as in the federal
kidnapping act,28 and in the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act.27 Legis-
lation of that character would have been more in keeping with the funda-
mental purpose here sought to be subserved.
R. JURCZAKrEWICZ
CORPORATIONS - MEMBERS AND STOCKHOLDERS - WHETHER MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS WHO DISSENT AT TIME OF MERGER LOSE RIGHT TO QUESTION
CORRECTNESS OF ALLOTTED SHARE VALUES BY SURRENDER OF SHARE
CERTIFICATES AND ACCEPTANCE oF SUm TENDERED--Certain minority stock-
holders, in the New York case of In re Silverman,' having duly objected
to the consolidation of their corporation with another, thereafter filed a
petition to secure a determination as to the valuation of their shares in
the manner prescribed by the New York Stock Corporation Law.2 Dis-
satisfied with the valuation placed on the stock by an appraiser, they then
took the matter before the Supreme Court, Special Term, only to have
the appraisal there affirmed. Pending an appeal to the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court, several of the dissenting shareholders voluntarily
turned over their certificates to the corporation and were paid the adjudi-
cated rate. Upon this showing, the Appellate Division granted a motion,
filed on behalf of the corporation, to dismiss the appeal as to these individ-
uals, relying on the idea that the dissenters had relinquished all their
rights in the shares and had thereby turned the appeal into a moot case.
On further appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, this holding was
reversed when the high court concluded that awards made in stock valua-
tion proceedings were to be regarded as among the listed exceptions to
the general rule that a litigant may not accept the benefits of a judgment
and also be permitted to appeal therefrom.3
255 U. S. C. §340.
26 18 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq.
27 Ibid. § 2311 et seq.
1305 N. Y. 13, 110 N. E. (2d) 402 (1953), reversing 117 N. Y. S. (2d) 920 (App.
Div., 1952). Froessel and Conway, JJ., dissented. The report of the proceedings
at Special Term appears in 115 N. Y. S. (2d) 97 (1952).
2Thompson, N. Y. Consol. Laws, 1950 Supp., Stock Corporation Law, Art. 3,
§ 21. An interesting sidelight on statutes of this character is afforded by the
decision in the case of Booma v. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., - Mass. -,
111 N. E. (2d) 742 (1953). In that case, a person who owned no shares on the
date notice was given of a special stockholders' meeting to vote on a proposed
consolidation but who acquired and secured registration of shares prior to the
date of the meeting, gave notice of dissent and demanded appraisal of his stock.
Relief was denied on the ground that he was not a person entitled to have the
benefit of the statute.
3 For a general discussion of this rule and its exceptions, see 2 Am. Jur., Appeal
and Error, §§ 214-5; 4 C. J. S., Appeal and Error, §§ 215-6; and annotation in 169
A. L. R. 987 and in 29 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1.
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To offset the common law doctrine that no change could be effected
in the form of a corporate organization except by the unanimous consent
of all shareholders, 4 forty-two states today have statutes regulating the
procedure for corporate merger and consolidation upon the vote of less
than all the outstanding stock. These statutes do, however, grant recogni-
tion to a right on the part of dissenting shareholders to withdraw from
the enterprise and to have the value of their shares determined and
repurchased by the corporation. 5 Typically, these statutes provide for the
appointment by a court of disinterested appraisers, usually three in num-
ber, who are directed to place a valuation on the stock.6 If the valuation
so fixed is not objected to by either the shareholder or the corporation,
it forms the basis upon which the shares are repurchased. If, however,
either party is not satisfied with the appraisers' determination, the right
to secure judicial review thereof is made dependent upon the particular
statute governing the merger or consolidation procedure.
In that regard, the New York statute involved in the instant case pro-
vided that, upon objection to the appraised valuation of the stock, the
objector had the right to secure review only if action was taken to that
end within a designated time. The initial utilization of this right by the
dissenting shareholders concerned in the instant case gave rise to the
particular problem under discussion. It should be noted, however, that
the question as to whether or not this problem could arise in other juris-
dictions would have to depend upon whether the particular statute makes
provision for an appeal under similar circumstances. A survey of the
various state statutes covering appraisal procedure would seem to indicate
that such statutes fall into one or the other of three possible categories.
A small number of these statutes not only declare that the valuation
of the appraisers is to be final and binding on all parties but also expressly
deny any right of appeal therefrom. 7 As a consequence, in these jurisdic-
tions, the problem which faced the court in the instant case could never
arise. In several other states, forming the second category, the statutes
contain no expression with regard to the allowance or denial of a right
to appeal, these statutes merely stating that the appraiser's determination
4 Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. R. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178, 90 Am. Dee. 617
(1867). But see Banet v. Alton & Sangamon R. R. Co., 13 Ill. 504 (1851).
5 Statutes bearing on the subject appear to be lacking in the states of Miss.,
N. D., S. D., Tex., Utah, and W. Va.
6 Mass. Ann. Laws 1948, Ch. 156, § 46e, serves as a good illustration. See also
Lattin, "A Reappraisal of the Appraisal Statutes," 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1165 (1940).
7 See, for example, Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, § 450.54, which declares: "The
appraisers shall submit their determination to the circuit court for confirmation
and upon entry of an order confirming said report their determination shall be
final and conclusive and from such order there shall be no appeal."
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is to be "final and conclusive. "8 Whether an appeal could, by implication,
be had in these jurisdictions would have to depend entirely upon the
interpretation which might be placed upon such language. A typical
example of one possible interpretation is to be found in the Delaware case
of Chicago Corporation v. Munds,9 where the court held that, under the
language of the then Delaware statute, 10 the appraisers' valuation would
actually be final and binding upon all parties except for those reasons
which would make any appraisal open to inquiry. It is true that the court
there proceeded to modify the appraised value for the reason that the
appraisers had considered only the market value of the stock in arriving
at the determination, but it is doubtful whether further appeal from the
modified appraisal would have been permitted. It is, therefore, unlikely
that the instant problem could arise in these jurisdictions.
The third, and final, category includes by far a majority of the states,
those possessing statutes wherein allowance of appeal to a higher court
has been given legislative approval. In these jurisdictions, the problem
under discussion could well arise and the holding in the instant case may
provide persuasive authority for similar holdings. As the Illinois statute
in point,"' except for the element of compulsory appraisal, is like that of
New York, it becomes a matter of interest as to whether or not, given a
set of facts similar to those of the instant case, an Illinois court would also
permit a dissenting shareholder to accept the benefits of a judgment for
the value of his shares and still pursue an appeal therefrom. A survey of
Illinois decisions discloses no case directly in point, although cases do exist
in which review has been had over the point of the correctness of the
amount awarded.12
The attitude of the Illinois courts in analogous situations, however,
might be said to be revealed by the case of Holt v. Rees13 where the court
said: "A party cannot accept money directed to be paid to him by decree,
and then ask reversal on the ground that it did not give him enough."14
8 The statutes of Colo., Conn., Ida., Mass., Mont., Neb., N. H., N. M., and Wash.,
would appear to be of that form.
9 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (1934). The holding therein was followed in the
later case of Root v. York Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 351, 50 A. (2d) 52 (1946).
10 See Del. Rev. Code 1935, Ch. 65, § 61. The statute was afterwards amended
to provide for review: Del. Corp. Laws Ann. 1951, Ch. 65, § 61.
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.70, providing for a judicial deter-
mination of the valuation of the dissenter's shares, states: "The practice, procedure,
and judgment shall be governed by the Civil Practice Act of this State." Appeal
is regulated by ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 201.
12 The cases are collected in a note in Ill. Bus. Corp. Act Annotated (Burdette
Smith Co., Chicago, 1947), Vol. 1, pp. 285-7.
'346 Ill. 181 (1867).
14 46 Ill. 181 at 183.
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This statement may be regarded as typical of a consistent position taken
by the Illinois courts in denying to a litigant, after he has accepted an
award or legal advantage under a judgment, a right to secure a review of
such adjudication as might again put in issue his right to the benefit
conferred.1 5
Two principal exceptions do appear, but neither would appear to be
helpful in this connection. One such exception notes that there is no waiver
of the right to appeal where the benefit accepted under the judgment is
conceded by all parties to be due.' 6 The second supposes that no waiver
occurs where the appeal is taken from a separable part of the decree not
involved in the payment made.17 While considerable latitude has been
exercised in the application of these exceptions by the courts of other ju-
risdictions,'8 they appear to have been narrowly construed in Illinois,"9
,hence it is unlikely that either would prove to be of assistance in a matter
of the type under consideration.
While a contrary holding might seem to put the dissenting shareholder
at a disadvantage, since he may be ill able to afford the expense and delay
of prosecuting his appeal, 20 the legislature may have considered the liberal
provision for interest on the whole amount finally awarded 2 1 as a sufficient
offset to this burden. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Illinois court would
follow the New York view expounded in the instant case. The decision
does suggest, however, a possible point for further legislative consideration.
The statute might be revised to provide for the deposit in court of the
15 Gridley v. Wood, 305 Ill. 376, 137 N. E. 251 (1922) ; Scott v. Scott, 304 Ill.
287, 136 N. E. 659 (1922); Langher v. Glos, 276 Ill. 342, 114 N. E. 590 (1916);
'Corwin v. Shoup, 76 Ill. 246 (1875); Ruckman v. Alwood, 44 InI. 183 (1867);
Thomas v. Negus, 7 Il1. 700 (1845) ; Morgan v. Ladd, 7 Ill. 414 (1845). See also
'Powell v. Amestoy, 337 Ill. App. 631, 86 N. E. (2d) 557 (1949).
16 In Schaeffer v. Ardery, 238 Ill. 557, 87 N. E. 343 (1909), for example, it was
held that the acceptance of tax money admittedly due did not preclude the tax
collector from appealing from an unfavorable decision concerning disputed taxes.
17 Kerner v. Thompson, 365 Ill. 149, 6 N. E. (2d) 131 (1937).
15 Note the critical discussion of the case of Bass v. Ring, 210 Minn. 598, 299
N. W. 679 (1941), appearing in the annotation in 169 A. L. R. 985 at 1031.
19 Boylan v. Boylan, 349 Il1. 471, 182 N. E. 614 (1932). In that case, the court,
concerned with an appeal from a decree of divorce, held the wife's acceptance of
a sum awarded for attorney's fees was sufficient to preclude her from questioning
other parts of the decree, first because the husband had not admitted liability for
such fees, and second, because the decree was deemed to be a unit and 'not com-
posed of separable parts.
20 See Pierce, "Right of Dissenting Shareholders," in Current Trends in State
Legislation (Univ. of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, 1952), pp. 145-63, par-
ticularly p. 151.
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.70, provides for interest on the amount
fixed as fair value of the shares "to the date of such judgment." The judgment
itself would draw interest at the rate of 5% from date of rendition: ibid., Ch. 74,
§ 3.
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sum which the corporation is willing to pay for the dissenter's shares,
freeing it from the obligation to pay interest thereon, with recognition
of a right to the withdrawal thereof on the part of the dissenter without
jeopardizing the right to appeal, but with further costs, expenses, and
interest claims to abide the eventual result.22  Such a revision would
embody the good features of the New York ase without leaving its accept-
ance open to the chance of judicial views on the point.
H. KEm
DIvORCE-DEFENSES-WHETHIIER OR NOT THE RECRIMINATORY MIS-
CONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF OPERATES TO BAR A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DIVORCE
-Construction of a statute relating to recrimination' was required in the
recent California case of DeBurgh v. DeBurgh.2 The plaintiff there sued
her husband for divorce, charging extreme cruelty. In response thereto,
the defendant filed a cross-complaint for divorce, also relying on the
ground of extreme cruelty. The lower court, after receiving proof of the
alleged facts, found that the acts of each party had been provoked by the
other; that each had been guilty of a cause for divorce; that the doctrine
of recrimination applied; and that neither party was entitled to a divorce.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, the judgment was reversed
principally because the court decided that cruelty which had been provoked
would not give rise to a cause of action for divorce, hence would not afford
a basis for the defense of recrimination, but it also interpreted the statute
in question so as to permit the trial court to exercise a sound judicial dis-
cretion as to the effect to be given to recrimination. It thereby promulgated
an opportunity for the application of the startling doctrine that a court
could grant a divorce, even though both parties were at fault, provided the
relationship of husband and wife had become such that the legitimate
objects of matrimony had been destroyed and a continuation of the mar-
riage would be against public policy.
3
22 Laws 1947, p. 905, held unconstitutional for reasons not here pertinent in
Department of Public Works v. Gorbe, 409 Ill. 211, 98 N. E. (2d) 730 (1951),
noted in 30 CHIOAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 142, could serve as an illustration for an
acceptable model.
1 Deering Cal. Civ. Code 1941, § 111, provides that "divorces must be denied
upon [a] showing . . . [of] recrimination." Section 122 thereof defines recrimina-
tion as a "showing by the defendant of any cause of divorce against the plaintiff
in bar of the plaintiff's cause of divorce."
239 Cal. (2d) 858, 250 P. (2d) 598 (1952), reversing 109 Cal. App. 335, 240 P.
(2d) 625 (1952).
3 Edmonds, J., and Shenk, J., each wrote a dissenting opinion in which they
concurred In the reversal because of the failure of the lower court to distinguish
between recrimination and provocation, but voiced the opinion that the statute
was mandatory in character so that, any time it appeared that both parties were
at fault, the defense of recrimination would become absolute and the trial court
would then lack power to do anything except to dismiss the action.
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The doctrine of recrimination, originating in the twelfth century
turies later when Lord Stowell, sitting in an English ecclesiastical court,
Roman canon law,4 appears to have been designed solely for the purpose
of protecting the property interests of the wife where both parties had
been guilty of adultery. It did not appear on the English scene until cen-
decided the case of Forster v. Forster,5 applied the doctrine of recrimina-
tion, and denied a divorce to the parties on that ground. While later
English courts appear to have realized the consequences of recrimination,
in that cohabitation between the parties was usually discontinued and im-
morality was usually increased, such courts were reluctant to overrule
the doctrine so established until the situation was remedied by the Matri-
monial Causes Act 6 and its subsequent amendments 7 which operated to
transfer divorce jurisdiction from ecclesiastical tribunals to the common
law courts and empowered the judges thereof to exercise a discretion in
the matter of granting a divorce where both parties were at fault.
One of the leading cases in the United States on the subject of
recrimination as an absolute bar to divorce, oddly enough, is the California
case of Conant v. Conant.8 It appears to have been instrumental in causing
the enactment, in 1872, of the California statute here in question and it
achieved the absolute bar to divorce result promulgated earlier by Lord
Stowell. Since then, the doctrine of recrimination so developed has been
explained on a number of theories. One theory, used most frequently,
rests on the doctrine of unclean hands and is based on the equitable
principle that the court should not aid one who has been guilty of in-
equitable conduct, at least in relation to the matter in which he seeks
relief from the court.9 Another explanation follows the mutually dependent
covenant theory.'0 Under it, the marriage contract is considered as one of
mutually dependent covenants so that, if both parties have been guilty of
a breach of any of these covenants, neither can be granted relief in the
form of divorce.
Still another theory, one likewise calling for a denial of divorce, has
4 Beamer, "The Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce Proceedings," 10 U. of
Kansas City L. Rev. 213 (1941).
51 Hag. Con. 144, 161 Eng. Rep. 504 (1790).
6 20 & 21 Vict., c. 86 (1857).
7 See 1 Edw. VIII, c. 31 (1936), and 1 Geo. VI, c. 57, § 4 (1937).
8 10 Cal. 249 (1858).
9 See, for example, Thorem v. Thorem, 188 Minn. 153, 246 N. W. 674 (1933),
and Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Ohio App. 322, 193 N. E. 657 (1933).
10 MacMillan v. MacMillan, 113 Wash. 250, 193 P. 673 (1928). See, however, the
cases of Flagg v. Flagg, 192 Wash. 679, 74 P. (2d) 189 (1937), and Huff v. Huff,
178 Wash. 684, 35 P. (2d) 86 (1934), applying the doctrine of comparative recti-
tude in a state where there is no statute on the point.
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been designated as the pari delicto, or equal fault, doctrine"1 from which
there has appeared, by implication, a subordinate doctrine to the effect
that, where the parties are not equally at fault, divorce may be granted
to the one least guilty. This last mentioned doctrine, sometimes designated
as the doctrine of comparative rectitude, although designed to eliminate
some of the anomalous consequences of recrimination, has not yet received
wide acceptance either in statutory or case form. It has, however, been
adopted in Iowa through the medium of the case of Smith v. Smith,12
and the courts of several other states, by way of dictum, have stated that,
in a sufficiently extreme case, a decree for divorce might be given to the
least guilty party.13
Independently of case-made law on the point, thirty-two American
jurisdictions make some provision by statute with respect to recrimination
while all others, with the exception of Connecticut, recognize some form of
the concept by judicial decision. 14 Twenty-nine of these states have statutes
which seemingly make it mandatory to deny divorce when the defendant
proves a recriminatory defense, 1 but many call for a consideration of
certain specific principles which must be complied with before recrimina-
tion may be established. In some instances, for example, recrimination
only applies where the ground relied on is of the same statutory character
as that asserted by the plaintiff.' 6 In others, the recriminatory charge is
confined to adultery only and does not apply to other grounds for divorce,17
nor may it be applied where the prior adultery has been condoned.' 8 In
"Johns v. Johns, 29 Ga. 718 (1860).
12 64 Iowa 682, 21 N. W. 137 (1884). See also Innskeep v. Innskeep, 5 Iowa
204 (1857).
'3 Hoagland v. Hoagland, 218 Ky. 636, 291 S. W. 1044 (1927) ; Kolaks v. Kolaks,
75 S. W (2d) 600 (Mo. App., 1934) ; Mueller v. Mueller, 165 Ore. 153, 105 P. (2d)
1095 (1940).
14 See Vernier, American Family Laws, Vol. 2, § 78, at p. 87.
15 An exception could be noted with respect to the statutes of Kansas, Oklahoma,
and Nevada, which expressly authorize the exercise of discretion. See Kans. Gen.
Stats. 1949, § 60-1506. as applied in Lassen v. Lassen, 134 Kan. 436, 7 P. (2d) 120(1932) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. 1951, Tit. 12, § 1275, and the case of Panther v. Panther,
147 Okla. 131, 295 P. 219 (1931) ; Nev. Comp. Laws 1931, § 9467.01. The District of
Columbia Code received a similar interpretation in the case of Vanderhuff v. Van-
derhuff, 79 App. 4. C. 153, 144 F. (2d) 509 (1944).
16 See Mich. Comp. Laws 1929, § 12732; Neb. Comp. Stats. 1929, Ch. 42, § 304;
Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1931, § 35-110. In Carter v. Carter, 151 S. W. (2d) 884 at
885 (Tex. Civ. App., 1941), the court stated: "To bar divorce, complainant's mis-
conduct need not be of equal degree with that of defendant's, but must be of the
same general character."
17 Ala. Stat. 1940, Tit. 34, § 26; Ariz. Stat. 1939, Ch. 27, § 806. See also Pavlevitch
v. Pavlevitch, 50 N. M. 224, 174 P. (2d) 826 (1946), overruling Chavez v. Chavez,
39 N. M. 480, 50 P. (2d) 264 (1935).
'8 Dela. Rev. Code 1935, Ch. 86, § 5; W. Va. Code Ann. 1937, § 4714; Wis. Stats.
1937, § 247.10.
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most of these statutes, however, the bar is stated as being applicable only
to mutual charges of adultery19 although the ground may have been given
wider application as the result of judicial expansion upon statutory lan-
guage. 20 In only three instances can it be said that legislatures have been-
sufficiently impressed with the doctrine of comparative rectitude to make it
the statutory ground for decision in cases calling for the application
thereof.21
Despite this, a slow trend toward the acceptance of that doctrine-may
be noticed even in the face of certain evident reversals on the point.
22
Much as the instant holding may be open to criticism for its failure to fol-
low what would seem to be a positive statute on the point,23 the result
attained appears to be far more equitable and desirable than has been
true with respect to many of the earlier holdings. To say the least, it dis-
closes a degree of liberality in the matter of granting divorce more nearly
in accord with present day practices.2
A. SrLvER
19 Il. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 11, In part states: "If it shall appear . . .
that both parties have been guilty of adultery, when adultery is the ground of
complaint, then no divorce shall be decreed."
20 See, for example, the case of Grady v. Grady, 266 Ill. App. 271 (1931), where,
on a complaint for divorce charging adultery, the defendant recriminated by
charging cruelty and desertion and divorce was denied. See also Zacharias,
"Recrimination in the Divorce Law of Illinois," 14 CHICAGO-KENT REVrEw 217-39
(1936).
21 See statutes cited in note 15, ante.
22 The Michigan Supreme Court, in Legatski v. Legatski, 230 Mich. 186, 203 N. W.
69 (1925), retreated from the position it had taken in the case of Weiss v. Weiss,
174 Mich. 431, 140 N. W. 587 (1913). See also the case of Hove v. Hove, 219 Minn.
590, 18 N. W. (2d) 580 (1945), where a court, not yet committed either way,
refused to adopt the principle.
23 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1945), 2d Ed.,
Vol. 1, p. 358, commenting on the California statute, states: "It is simple and
unambiguous and is fairly based on the reasoning given by the courts for the doc-
trine of recrimination. This type of statute provides that in a suit for divorce
for any cause a defendant may show recrimination by showing that the plaintiff
is guilty of any cause. It is the same rule as exists in states having no statutes
on the subject. Denial of the divorce is mandatory."
24 Jacobs, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 Mich. I. Rev. 749 at 751 (1936),
declares that "the manner in which present day divorces are handled is extremely
liberal. It is only in increasingly rare cases that the courts refuse to grant divorces.
Free consent divorce exists in the United States today as fact, not merely as a
phenomenon of the divorce mill, but as the standard practice throughout the
country."
